The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (Making History)

Product Information

Sir Edward Grey, Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War: A Re-Evaluation', International History Review, April 2016, 38, No.2, 301-325 It seems to me that the problem with the blame-centred approach is not so much that you might end up blaming the wrong party because frankly now a hundred years later, as you say, it doesn’t matter who we blame, politically it doesn’t make any difference. The real danger is that you end up deciding who you think is the culprit – you know bringing in the suspect and then constructing a charge sheet against that suspect in prosecutorial manner which is exactly what Fritz Fischer did. The problem is that that’s such a narrow approach. What we really need to understand is how did this war come about? Once we understand how the war came about, then we can ask questions about why it came about and because of whom; and we need to ask how first and allow the why and who questions to arise out of the how answers, rather than the other way around. Der hundertjährige Krieg um die Kriegsschuldfrage', in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 65, 5/6 2014, pp.303-337

Gerhard Hirschfeld: I don't see parallels. History does not repeat itself. History is, in a way, dependent on certain factors and conditions that are different from what we used to have. There are no parallels between 1914 and 2014. Having said that, there is one element, however, that, I'm afraid, creates continuity and this is the human factor. People do not change. They have the same feelings, emotions, ambitions, strivings for power. So, when it comes to judging the personal factor, the ambitions of politicians, there I would say is an element of continuity. But the historical context changed dramatically. We didn't have a NATO in 1914, we didn't have an OSCE, an EU. We didn't have international organizations and alliances that are controlling elements of a crisis. You have the same emotions, but not the same conditions and historical structures as in the past. The goal of German and Austrian diplomats following the Sarajevo incident was to try to localize a conflict in the Balkans. Now, this may have been unrealistic, but the ideal scenario in both Berlin and Vienna was for Austria-Hungary to be able to confront Serbia without the other powers intervening. Russia's own policy or position, of course, was to continentalize the crisis and then the conflict. To make sure that France would get involved, and also Britain. To make sure that if it came to war, Britain and France would fight on their side. So, in this sense, turning it into a European and world conflagration was actually Russia's policy. That is not to say that Russia bears sole responsibility either. That is to say, it was the combination of the Austro-German response to Sarajevo and then the Russian response to the Austrian move against Serbia. This is what produced the Great War.Clark has greatly advanced our understanding of these crucial events by shifting our focus away from Central Europe to the Balkans, as well as from the immediate causes of the war in 1914 to 1903, thus moving the debate in new directions and highlighting how crucial these “Serbian Ghosts” are for understanding the Balkan origins of the war. Based on Clark's new approach, International Relations theorists have come to understand this brutal act of 1903 as the start of territorial or spatial rivalries between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (the two had maintained better relations before 1903 than they ever would again): “If one could find an initial origin of the war, separate from long-term structural forces, the 1903 murder was it,” political scientist John A. Vasquez argues. Footnote 34 So when we look at evidence of German culpability, the documents that stand out in particular which were first found by Fritz Fischer are those relating to the war council of December 1912 and then those relating to war aims – the famous September programme of 1914 – and I just wonder what your take is on these events and on these documents? She has published widely on German military planning in the years before the First World War, and has contributed to the historiographical debate on the nature of the Schlieffen Plan. She has edited primary sources on the origins of the First World War, and published a German language book on the July Crisis of 1914. She is currently working on a comparative history of the Battle of the Marne of 1914 to be published by Cambridge University Press.

Germany’, in Holger Herwig and Richard Hamilton (eds), War Planning 1914, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 48-79 Find out more about this book By contrast, few historians argued, until recently, for British responsibility for the outbreak of war. Britain's foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, has traditionally been seen as one of the few decision-makers who honestly worked toward keeping the peace in July 1914. Footnote 24 In fact, most historians agreed that London was the only capital where decision-makers were reluctant to contemplate war. Distracted until the very end of the crisis by the Irish Question, a war on the continent was, for Britain, only a golden opportunity because it could diffuse the domestic crisis: it is no exaggeration to say that a civil war loomed over the Irish Question in the summer of 1914. Margot Asquith's recently published diary, for example, clearly shows the preoccupation with Ireland during the fateful weeks of the summer of 1914, an impression confirmed by other contemporary accounts. “All happened in such a short time,” the Prime Minister's wife recorded on August 4: “On 30 th July everyone was talking of Ireland. The cry of ‘Civil war! Civil war!’ to which The Times and the Tories treated us every day has been stilled in five days.” Footnote 25 John Keiger: Yes, I'm afraid that, rather pessimistically, I do think that, particularly over Ukraine, but also perhaps over what is going on in the Far East, [where] there is a potential for things to go horribly wrong. One incident in which the pride of a nation becomes implicated -- like, for instance, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 -- that kind of incident, if it came today, say, the assassination of a major person in Ukraine that immediately brought into play the various external powers, then that could provoke a very serious incident. That does concern me. I don't think the United Nations would be able to do very much. It is very hard to know, but, for instance, if the Russian ambassador in Ukraine was assassinated, what would happen?I published my book Die Julikrise in 2014 to present my research-based counter-argument to the centenary revisionist interpretations. I argued that all the major powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France and Russia) had some responsibility for the escalation of the July Crisis but that the German and Austro-Hungarian governments deliberately provoked this crisis without flinching at the possibility of unleashing a major war. Die Julikrise has sold more than 6,000 copies and is also available in Danish and Turkish. Crucially, the book, and other publications in history journals and public forums, have given me a platform to engage in public debate. The German Reich was not “guilty” of World War I. Such a category did not exist then, for, according to the code of European state wars, sovereign states had the “ ius ad bellum” as long as they could claim a violation of their interests. In 1914, this right to war applied least to Great Britain because the United Kingdom could not claim an immediate interest of coalition obligation for an intervention in a local war (between Austria-Hungary and Serbia). Only the British entry into the war turned the original conflict into a global disaster. Footnote 114 Ever since the First World War started, historians have debated why it began; we’re now looking at a hundred year debate; we’re looking at mountains of documents; thousands of books written on the topic; and yet even now historians don’t agree on why war started in 1914. John has worked at the University of Sussex for all his academic life – and why are you so interested in the topic? In: Epkenhans, Michael; Foerster, Stig and Hagemann, Karen eds. Militaerische Erinnerungskultur. Soldaten im Spiegel von Biographien, Memoiren und Selbstzeugnissen (pp. 132-151)